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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF VT~:.'.~intiff-Respowient, I 
LAVELL ROBINSON, ( 
Defendant-Appellant. } 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
20338 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Lavell Robinson, appeals from a con-
viction for driving under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor rendered by he Honorable Judge Leonard W. 
Elton in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted of driving under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor by the Honorable Judge 
Elton and sentenced to forty ( 40) days in Salt Lake 
County Jail and fined $299.00. The sentence was sus-
1wnded upon the payment of $175.00 
The Judge in this case wrote a memorandum de-
cision in which he explained, " ... The court feels that 
in this case, but for the results of the breath test, the 
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2 
verdict would have been diff ercnt. Neither the arrest-
ing officer's testimony or the testimony of the officer 
administering the test as to Defendant's actions would 
have been sufficiPnt by itself to find the Defendant 
guilty." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction m the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE F Acrrs 
This is a very important case of first impression 
upon this court involving the question of the admissibili-
t:-', the validity, and the constitutionality of the breath-
al:-'zPr t0st as administPred in tlw case at har. 
The appellant was ant•sted for driving under the in-
fluence of intoxicaing liquor following an accident in-
volving a collision with a vehicle driven by Melvin Stauf-
fer which resulted in over $500.00 damage to the front 
end of appellant's vehicle. (Court transcript p. 15). Ap-
proximately hv'enty minutes prior to the accident th0 
appellant had consumed two "scre·wdriver highballs" 
during a period of approximately one-half honr. FollovY-
ing the arrPst, tlw ap1wllant 1yas told that hE' could takP 
a breath, hloocl, or nrirn• frst, and that he conld refus0 
to talw th0 t0sts lrnt npon doing so he might lose hiP-
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license for a period of a year (Court transcript p. 12). 
The appellant therefor consented to take the breath tc>st 
at the Redwood Station-approximately three-quaters 
of an hour after the accident had occurred (Court tran-
script p. 13). The officer conducting the breathalyzer 
test testified that he obtained a reading of .180 (it is 
assumed, of course, that he meant he obtained a .180 
reading on the machine which is, in reality, .180%. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-
SULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE A PROPER FOUNDATION WAS 
NOT LAID FOR ITS ADMISSION. 
B<>fore evidence of the resnlts of a breathal~7zer test 
can be entered into evidence, c<>rtain criteria concerning 
the operation of the machine must be satisfied. It must 
bti shown: (1) That the machine was properly checked 
and in proper working order at the time of the conduct-
ing of the test; (2) that the chemicals used were the 
corn'ct kind and compounded in the proper proportions; 
(3) that the snhjPct had nothing in his mouth at the time 
of tht> tPst and that he had eaten no food and taken no 
drink ·within fiftPPn minutes prior to taking the test; ( 4) 
that tlw t<'st was con<lncte<l hy a qualified operator in the 
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proper manner. State v. Baker, 56 \¥ash. 846, 355 P. 2d 
806, 809 (1960). The court further pointed out that the 
state must produce prima facie evidence that each of the 
four above requirements have bePn complied ·with before 
the results of a breathalyzer test may be admitted into 
(~vidence. The reasons for such precautions by the courts 
becomes quite obvious when it is realized that the amount 
of alcohol in the breath necessary to result in a reading 
of .180% is 1/20,000 cubic centimeter in the entire 52.5 
en. cm. of air in the breathalyzer cylinder. This is so 
since there is the same amount in one cubic centimeter 
of hlood as there is in 2100 cubic centimeter of breath. 
Saying there is 18/10,000 cubic centimeter in one cubic 
centinwtPr of blood ( .180%) means there is that sanw 
amount in 2100 cubic centimeter of brt'ath or, in other 
words, 18/400,000 cubic cpntimeter in the 52.5 cubic 
rentimdPr hrr>athalyzt>r cylinder. This means that if a 
iwrson had absolutely no alcohol in h1:s bloodstream, tlw 
hreathal~-zt>r -.,rnnld still registE'r approximately .180% if 
he had 1/10 cnhic cE'ntinwtt>r (approximatE"ly 1/300 of 
a fluid oz.) in his mouth at tlw timP of the test. 
There was no attempt on the part of the officers to 
find out if the appellant had used any medication that 
night nor did they check his month at the time of his 
test. Tlwy based their decision in this area merely on the 
fact that the arresting officer did not obst'rve the dt>-
frndant vomit. Considering the extremely small amount 
of alcohol which would iwecl to hP in tliP mouth at tlw 
tinw of th0 tPst in or<l<'l' to rPsnlt in a rt'ading- of .l807r, 
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especially when the fact that the appellant wore false 
teeth ·which may Pasily have trapped as much as 1/300 
of a fluid oz. inside his mouth prior to the time of the 
test, the failure of the state to produce prima facie evi-
dence that this requirement was met ruled out the results 
of the breathalyzer test and prejudicial error resulted 
since the court based its decision solely on the results of 
the breathalyzer test, deeming the other evidence com-
vl<:>tely insufficient to justify a conviction. 
Secondly, the fourth requirement, as well as the 
third requirement, was not met since Officer Jensen was 
not adequately shown to be a qualified operator merely 
lwcause he had taken a two \\'eek class from officer Gale 
which included two days work with the br<:>athalyzn. He 
admitted that he does not know how the machine operates 
-merely that it do E's. Officer Jen sen and Officer Jens en 
alonP gave thesE' tests to the defendant. The state failed 
in an attempt to further show the competency of Officer 
.Jensen' as-an operator. Officer Gale's testimony was only 
that he had taught the class which Officer Jensen attend-
ed. He did not testify as having seen Officer Jensen 
opNak one of thPse de,·ices, so his testimony that, in 
his opinion, Officrr Jensen \Yas competent to conduct the 
ln·eathal~.,1,t,r tc'st, was also insufficient to show prima 
farie tl1at Offirer .J <:>nsrn was a qnalifi<:>d individual or 
that l1P rornlnrtPd th(• t<•st in thr prop<:>r rnannrr. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-
SULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO 
EXTRAPOLATE THE RESULTS OF THE TEST BACK TO 
THE TIME WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING HIS 
AUTOMOBILE. 
The prosecution's expert witness admitted that the 
breathalyzer results only tell the quantity that is in the 
blood stream at the time the test was given. It in no 
·way, by itself, tells what the amount of alcohol in the 
breath was, say, forty-five minutes later. It is the ap-
pellant's contention that the failure of the prosecution 
to extrapolate the results back to the time the appellant 
was driving his automobile rendered the results inad-
missible in a prosecution for driving under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor. The evidence in this case tended 
to show that the appellant had had two "screwdriver 
highballs" over a period of about half an hour-finishing 
the last drink approximately twenty minutes prior to 
the time of the accident. The state's expert witness on 
the breathalyzer also stated that you would not reach an 
equilibrium (that point where you are absorbing alcohol 
into your blood stream at the same rate as you are dissi-
pating it) until about forty-five minutes after you have 
consumed the last drink. Prior to this time the alcohol 
c.ontent in your hlood will he rising. There was no in-
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formation placed into evidence however which would en-
able the court to make any decision as to the degree of 
intoxication at the time the defendant was driving the 
automobile. 
The best way, although not the only way by any 
means, that the prosecution could have extrapolated the 
results back would have been to have produced a chart 
into evidence by their expert witness, or some other 
source, showing what amount of alcohol would have been 
absorbed into the blood twenty minutes after the last 
drink in comparison to the amount in the system (for the 
amount of alcohol consumed-considering the build of 
the appellant, the amount of food in his stomach, etc.) 
sixty-five minutes after the last drink. This would have 
adequately overcome the problem of extrapolating the 
results back but, since the prosecution utterly failed to 
do so, the court should not have based its decision on 
the results of the breathal>-zer test and, in doing so, the 
court created prejudicial error to the appellant. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-
SULTS OF THE BREATHALYZER TEST TO BE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE SINCE THE TEST WAS THE RESULT 
OF COERSION AND WAS, THEREFORE, TAKEN IN VIOLA-
TION OF U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 AND THE APPELLANT'S CON-
STITUTION AL RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
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The Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10 states, " ... If 
such person has been requested to submit to any one of 
the above chemical tests and refuses to submit to such 
chemical test, the test shall not be given ... "Under this 
statnte, then, the defendant was not to be forced into 
t~1king such a test. The appellant contends that by in-
forming him that if he refused to take the test his license 
,,-ould be taken away he was, in reality, coerced into 
taking the tPst. Such coercion would vitiate any such 
c,ornwnt which would he necPssar>- to g-ivP snrh a test 
Compton L State, Colo., 444 P. 2d 263 (1968) invoh--
ed a similar state statute which provided, "no person 
shall he required to take a blood alcohol test without his 
eonsPnt." In that case the appellant moved to suppress 
thP n•sults of the blood alcohol test and the court pointed 
out, "it was propPr for the trial judge to resolve thP 
rnatt(•r as to tlw 'voluntariness' of the hlood alcohol test 
along the sanw proceclnral lines as would 1w followed in 
d<'t<•rmining thP admissibility or nonadmissihility of a 
confession." at 265. The court furth(~r explained that, 
wrhP Prror of tlw trial court occurred when it thereafter 
snhmittPd to tlw jur~- the results of the blood alcohol 
t<>st without haxing first determinPd that consent to tl1P 
taking of the test was ginm by the defendant." Thus, 
lmde1' a similar statnte, it has lwen held that consent 
mnst lw ohtai1wd and it must hP a "'·oluntary consPnt", 
un lik~· tlw roPl'C<'d eonse>nt as in the cast> at bar. It is 
tnw that ~von ran tab· a p<•rson's licPns<' away from hirn 
ii' lw (l0<'s:1'• hk<· ilt<' lm•atl1 t<'sL 'T'h<' point lt<T<' is, 
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rather, that by telling him he is going to lose his license 
if he does not comply, most assuredly vitiates any "con-
sent" to take one of the tests. 
This case also involves a violation of the appellant's 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination under the 
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 12 which states, 
" ... The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself ... " (emphasis ours). This differs sub-
stantially from the United States Constitution, Fifth 
Amendment which states, " ... nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " 
which is a near duplicate of the California Constitution 
Article l, Section 13, Clause 5 which states, "nor be com-
pelled in an~Y criminal proceeding to be a witness against 
himself". Thus the Supreme Court of the United States 
in SchmerlJer t'. California, 384 U.S. 757, 8G Sup. Ct. 
182G, lG L. Ed. 2d 908 (19G6) was not considering a 
statntt> such as that in Utah's Constitution and their 
holding that a blood test does not fall under the category 
being a "witness" against oneself (which implies only 
the spoken word) is not binding in Utah since here he 
cannot even be compelled to give "evidence" against 
himself. However, the appellant in the case at bar was 
compelled to give evidence against himself in violation 
of the Utah Constitution since he was told by the arrest-
ing officPr that if lw did not take the tPst his license 
would hP takPn away. 
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Texas and Oklahoma, the two leading states in the 
area of admissibility of compelled evidence of intoxica-
tion, both have constitutional articles like Utah's. The 
Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 10 states, " ... He 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself 
... " and the Oklahoma Constitution Article 2, Section 21 
states, " ... No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
that will tend to incriminate him ... " Both states have 
genPrally held that tests to discern the degree of intoxica-
tfon in a person fall within the category of "evidence" 
and if the evidence is not given freely, with knowledge 
of his rights to refuse, such evidence may not be consid-
Prl'd hy the conrt as, in any way, tending to show intoxi-
eation of the defendant. 
The leading Texas case of Apodaca v. State, 140 
rr(•xCr.R. 593, 146 S."W. 2d 381 (1940) involved a urim· 
te:-;t which ~was given to the defendant without his con-
sl'nt. The conrt held that this was a violation of th(• 
Texas Constitution Artcile 1, Section 10, supra, sinc1• 
demonstration by an act or non-oral evidence involving 
self-incrimination is as obnoxions to the constitution as 
s0lf-incrimination hy words. 
Sevr>ral cases have also ansen rn Oklahoma under 
tlwir Constitntional Article 2, Section 21, supra. Cox L 
Sfafr, Okla. Cr., 39!5 P. 2d 054 (1904) involn>d two tests 
givrn to the ddendant to asc(>rtain if he were under tlw 
infhwnc<' of n lcol101. Tn tliat ease, tlw con rt poinh'd ont 
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that the state constitutional provision against compelling 
the accused to give evidence which will incriminate hjm 
includes real as well as oral testimony. The court fur-
ther stated that if it were found that the tests on the 
defendant were not freely, knowingly, or voluntarily 
made on the part of the defendant then the jury must 
disregard such tests and results thereof as affording 
any evidence against him. Spencer v. State, Okla. Cr. 
404 P. 2d 46 (1965) and Stewart v. State Okla. Cr., 435 
P. 2d 191 (1967) followed the Cox case where evidence 
of films taken of the defendant while performing tests 
under the direction of the police without the knowledge 
or consent of the defendant was not allowed. In the case 
at bar, where the appellant was coerced into taking the 
breathalyzer test, the results should have been disre-
garded by the court. By using the tests as the primary 
basis for a finding of driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, prejudicial error was committed. 
CONCLTTSTON 
The conviction for driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor should be reversed since prejudicial 
error was committed in allowing the results of the 
breathalyzer to be the basis of a conviction for "dnmk" 
driving in this case. The results should have been dis-
regarded for three basic reasons: A proper foundation 
was not laid for the results of the breathal~'zer; the pros-
eention failPd to extrapolate th0 rt>snlts hack to the time 
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when the appellant was driving his automobile; and the 
test was conducted only after the appellant was coerced 
into taking it by a threat that his license would be taken 
away if he didn't take the test-violating Utah Code 
Ann. 41-6-44.10 and his rights against self incrimination 
under the Utah Constitution. Thus, the conviction should 
be reversed and this court should decide in this case of 
first impression, that the breathalyzer test as conducted 
in this case was inadmissible, invalid, and unconstitu-
tional. 
Respt>ctfnlly suhmitted, 
MITSUN AG A & ROSS 
Galen Ross 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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